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SALES BY SAMPLE.
DEVIATION FROM CIVIL LAW.
The doctrine of the civil law that a vendor impliedly war-
rants that the thing sold by him has a certain quality, has been
rejected by the common law. Its maxim is, as respects the
quality, caveat emptor. If he wants a liability on the vendor's
part, as to quality, let him stipulate'for it. If he does not stip-
ulate for it, the law will not furnish it. Reasons for this prin-
ciple, stated by Gibson C.J., are (a) it is the common law; (b)
it is more convenient and just., To like one's law because it is
one's law, may seem Very shrewd to a good patriot, but hardly
to a jurist; and it is unnecessary to remark upod the ineptitude
of such an observation. Why is the common law more "con-
venient?" Gibson's answer is, because instead of dealing with
duties that are too subtle for judicial cognizance, the rule fur-
nishes a plain test of the vendor's liability in two words, war-
ranty or fraud. How is the duty too "subtle"? Does the jus-
tice mean that it is difficult to differentiate degrees of quality?
So it is, but not more so than to do a hundred other tasks which
courts have not declined. The courts will not refuse to enforce
a warranty that the thing sold is sound, or good, but discrimina-
tion of quality, when there is an express warranty, is precisely
the same process as it would be if the warranty were only im-
plied. Besides it is not the convenience of the courts, so much
as the accomplishment of justice, that ought to be their ob-
ject. The common law rule, says the Chief-Justice, is better,
"because it pretends not to release the vendee from his bargain,
where it happens to be a bad one." But, the question is, what
shall be understood to be the bargain? If the law says, a vendor
1Borrekins v. Bevan, 3 R. 23.
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shall be understood unless he stipulates for exempItion, to war-
rant the goodness of the-thing sold, he soon learns that it does.
The vendee also learns it, and therefore is dissuaded from obtain-
ing an express warranty. When, under such a rule, he insists
on obtaining a thing of good quality, he surely is not insisting-
on being released from his bargain, because it is a bad one. He
entered, as did the vendor, into a bargain to which both knew
that the law added a term, viz. a warranty. To insist on the
execution of that term, is not to insist on an injustice. The lan-
guage of the Chief Justice is deficient in meaning. Lowrie J.,
finds the further objection to a rule which too easily casts on the
vendor a liability for quality, that it would foster a spirit of liti-
gation by encouraging every man who is disappointed in the ad-
vantages expected from a bargain, "to drown his sorrows in the
excitement of an action at law." He adds that there is "noth-
ing on which people are more apt to differ and nothing on which
they are less-apt to trust each other" than representations of
the quality of goods sold.' Men enter into bargains with the
expectation that they will' be kept, and judges are paid to in-
crease, by their readiness to vindicate defeated expectations, the
probability of a performance of contracts. If the judges caused
a vendee to understood that when he was buying a thing he
might expect a thing of good quality, or compensation for its
being of bad quality, why should he not expect such compensa-
tion, when he was disappointed with respect to the quality? It
is sometimes said that it would clog trade,3 i.e. sales of goods,'if
the vendor were held to warrant quality. But how? If he will
not sell, uinless he is free from liability for quality, is it not
equal4y true that the vendee will not buy, unless he can rely on
the possession by the article of a certain quality? And if B will
not buy from A, is it not true that A cannot sell to him? Be-
sides it is always possible, even when the rule of the civil law
obtains, for the vendor to stipulate that he assumes no liability
for quality. The question between the systems is nothing more
than the question shall the vendor have the trouble expressly to
2Wetherill v. Neifson, zo Pa. 448.
3Gibson C.J., says trade is encouraged by preventing actions against all
in turn through whose hands an article has passed, but it will be discour-
aged by giving an action, in sale by sample, or under a denomination, to
the buyer, even for the failure of the thing to correspond in essential char-
acter, in species, in kind, with the sample or the denomination 1l
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require exemption from liability for quality or shall the vendee
have the trouble expressly to require liability for quality.
THE USE OF A SAbIPLE.
When a vendor, or a vendee, in his negotiation for the sale
or purchase of a thing which is not present, and subject to the
inspection and examination of the vendee, exhibits a sample,
the sample may be intended to show the class or kind of thing
or the qualities of the thing. The class or kind, it is rarely, if
ever, necessary to manifest by a specimen. Classes have names,
and the use of a name in negotiation as fully defines the class,, as
would that of a sample. If B orders from A a ham, or beef, or
stockings, or shirting, or tobacco, he has already indicated the
kind,. individuals possessing which he is bargaining for. Why
should a ham be exhibited, in order to inform the vendor or
vendee, what kind of an object it is which they are bargaining
about? But objects of certain kinds or classes may differ from
each other infinitely with regard to various qualities. The ham
might be large or small, cured by one process or another, sound
or unsound, and the degrees of unsoundness are in number
lqrge. The words used by the parties might not be able to ex-
press the various qualities, and shades of qualities, which they
intended the articles to possess, concerning the sale of which
they were negotiating. A specimen would be highly useful, per-
haps indispensable, to define these qualities. That the parties
intended, in using it, to define these qualities would be a most
reasonable supposition. Nevertheless, the judges of Pennsyl-
vania have been the only persons in the Anglo-Saxon world, who
refused to make this supposition. "In England, Canada, and.
in all of the United States, so far as is shown by reported de-
cisions, except in Pennsylvania" says the American and English
Encyclopedia of Law4 "the rule is well settled that when a con-
tract for the sale of goods is made by sample, it amounts to an
undertaking, bn the part of the seller, with the purchaser, that
all the goods shall correspond in kind, character and quality,
with those exhibited!" The courts having disjoined Pennsyl-
vania from the rest of the Anglo-American world, it was neces-
sary for the legislature to restore its unity with the other kin-
dred states and nations,. as it did by the act of April 13th, 1887;
P. L. 21.
Vol. 15, P. 1225.
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WHAT WARRANTY, IN SAL BY SAMPLE.
From the use of a sample, in effecting a contract to sell, al-
though nothing is said concerning the correspondence between
the thing to be delivered by the vendor -to the vendee, and the
sample, the courts in Pennsylvania, prior to 1887, implied a war-
ranty by the vendor, that the thing that should be delivered
should be of the same kind as the sample.5  But what is a kind?
An apple is a kind of fruit; so is a pear or a cherry. But, there
are hundreds of varieties of apples known to connoisseurs, and
even enumerated in the Standard Dictionary. There are Amer-
ican Golden Russet, Hocking, Rambp, Tulpehocken, etc. If the
apples exhibited as samples are Rambos, is there a contract that
those to be furnished shall be Rambos? Probably. Rogers, J.,
observed, "If a person purchase Madeira wine of a wine mer-
chant, surely he cannot be compelled to take Teneriffe, Lisbon,
Sherry, or Malaga."'  He mentions a diamond as different in
kind from a piece of glass; and jalop from cream of tartar. As
wines are divisible into Sherry, and Malaga, etc., so Sherry is
divisible into sub-classes, by virtue of certain qualities. Fruit is
divisible into pears, apples, plums, peaches. Apples are again
divisible into Rambo, Tulpehocken, etc. All Rambos are not
the same in size or shape, and differences of flavor, and hard-
ness, etc., can be observed between them. The same apple may
be in different states at different times; when it is green, when
ripe, when overripe. Is the green Rambo apple a different kind
from the ripe? or the rotten? We are told by Clark, J., that a
sound apple and the same apple rotten, "are articles entirely
different in kind," and sound, unpared evaporated peaches,
are different in kind, from the same peaches, when they have lost
the quality of soundness, and have become so mouldy and de-
cayed as to be unmerchantable as such."7 When certain objects
in certain states, have acquired a certain denomination under
which they are sold, they have probably come to form a "kind."
If articles are sold as "apples," the understanding is that they
5Bovd v. Wilson, 83- Pa. 319; Shaw v. Fleming, 174 Pa. 52; Sims v.
Striblen, x6 Phila. 9; Selser, v; Roberts, xo5 Pa. 242; Borrekins v. Bevan, 3
R. 23; Fraley v. Bispham, io Phila. 320.
6Borrekins v. Bevan, 3 R. 23. Coulter J., says, if an article is sold as a
diamond and turns out to be glass, or as tea when it is in fact chaff, the
vendor would be responsible; Fraley v. Bispham, 5o Pa. 320.
TSelser v. Roberts, io5 Pa. 242.
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are not decayed apples. Decayed apples have some use. They
may be fed to swine, perhaps; they may be used as manure; but
if sold they would be sold, not as "apples" but as "decayed ap-
ples." The trade would have made a classification, and would
have adopted one name for one class, and another for the other
class; and when A undertakes to sell articles as of one class,
tender of an article of the other would not be a discharge of the
contract.
MCRcHANTABLB.
The rule that a sale by sample, is a sale of'a thing which is
of the kind to which the sample belongs, is qualified by the ad-
dition, that the thing of the kind must be merchantable as a
thing of that kind, under the kind-name. When A sells goods
by sample, the goods furnished by him "need not correspond
with the sample except in kind," said the court, adding, properly,
"but the goods must be merchantable as that kind."' When is
a thing merchantable under a given denomination? That it can-
not be sold at a. certain price, is not unmerchantableness. It
might be sold under the same name, e. g. as tea, at a less price.
In a certain case, the vendor of tea sued for the price. The
vendee paid him for it -from fourteen to twenty-two cents per
pound, and he offered it at retail at fifty cents and more, per
pound. His inability to sell it at that price was not evidence
that it was unsalable.' 'Yar could be sold as yarn, although it
was inferior in quality, twist and strength to the yarn that was
employed as the sample, and there would be no breach of the
warranty implied in the use of the sample."0 The fact that
raisins, which have been sold by a sample of sound raisins, are
slightly damaged and are inferior to the sample, and have been
sold by the buyer at a loss, is no breach of the warranty.11 There
was no breach when chromatic cards sold by sample, were de-
fective in cut, print and assortment." On the pages on which
Clark J., informs us that sound and rotten apples are different
in kind, he advises us that "to hold that a sale-by sample, with-
6Selser v. Roberts, soS Pa. 242; Boyd v. Wilson, 83 Pa. 3x9; Shaw v.
Fleming, x74 Pa. 52; Sims v. Striblen, 16 Phila. 9.
'Tete Bros, v. Eshler, ix Super 224.
18Shaw v. Fleming, 174 Pa. 52.
"'Badeau v. Auerbacb, 2 W. N. 223.
i2Haddock v. Meyer, 38 Leg. Int. 311.
"Selser v. Roberts, io5 Pa. 242
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out more, imports a sale of sound goods not damaged or spoiled"
is erroneous. An apple "spoiled'? is probably a "rotten" apple,
and how the delivery of rotten apples, in fulfilment of a sale by
a sample of sound apples, is a breach of the implied warranty,
while a delivery of "spoiled" apples is not, is given to the micro-
scopically wise, only to see." Perhaps what we are to under-
stand is that there are degrees of being "spoiled" or "damaged"
and that apples in some of these degrees, would nevertheless be
merchantable as apples,. while in other greater degrees they
would not be merchantable as apples, though possibly as hog-
feed, or as manure; and that if the apples, though "spoiled"
were only so far spoiled as still to be merchantable as apples,
their imperfection was no breach of the implied warranty. In
Borrekins v. Bevan" 'the sale was by sample of what is known as
"blue, paint" or Prussian blue. The article furnished was, ap-
parently, known as a different thing in the market, under the
name "verditerblue." Delivery of this article was treated as a
breach of the warranty, implied in the use of a sample of Prus-
sian blue paint.
ADULTERATION.
An article of a certain kind and name, may be intermingled
with an article of a different kind and name; that is, there may
be an adulteration of each by the other; or of the dearer with
the cheaper. "Wines are constantly adulterated with brandy,"
said the court in an early case," "in fact it is in some degree a
constituent part of the finest Madeira; and brandy itself passes in
the market although notoriously adulterated with alcohol, in a
cheaper form. Drugs, chemicals, paints, dye-stuffs, and a count-
less number of other commodities are constantly purchased by
dealers or consumers, with full knowledge that they are not en-
tirely free from admixture. The pigment called white lead, -is
frequently purchased by house-painters, when they are apprised
In Boyd v. Wilson, 83 Pa. 319, corn in cans was sold by sample. In
some of the cans the corn was bad, and, when cooked,was found to be sour,
greasy and unfit for food. This was held not to be a violation of the war-
ranty of kind and merchantableness, implied in the sale by sample.
153 R. 23. One witness said the thing delivered "might be called blue
paint, but it does not resemble any paint we sell under that name. I think
there is inferior blue venditer among it mixed in with dirt. I shoald not
consider this any paint; verditer is not called a ljgh priced paint."
16Jennings v. Gratz, 3 R. x68.
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that it contains a portion of Spanish whiting, which, is not sup-
posed to affect the denomination of the article, but its quaity
and price." In the case quoted from, A had sold to B, "Young
Hyson Tea." Some of the chests contained tea adulterated 'with
leaves of another plant not of the tea family. Whether the
adulteration was so extensive as to make it improper to call the
article sold Hyson Tea, was a question. The court admitted
that adulteration might be carried so far as to "destroy the dis-
tinctive character of the thing altogether," and said that in
doubtful cases, the only practical test was whether the admix-
ture still remained merchantable under the name tea. That the
teas returned by the buyer had been resold by the vendor, at
prices not greatly reduced, and to dealers who knew of the first
vendee's objection to the tea, was an indication that despite the
adulterations, the tea was still merchantable as tea. In Hoffman
v. Burr" "cotton pickings" being described as what is gathered to-
gether in the warehouses or elsewhere, from the cotton, when
prepared for the market, and uaturally containing other things
than cotton more or less, it was recognized that there might be
more or less of those other things, and therefore more of them
than were in the sample by which a lot of pickings was sold.
Reference is made in Borrekins v. Bevan, to the English case of
Proser v. Hart, 1 Starkie 140, where so-called saffron was sold
of which saffron composed. but three fourths, and it is said that
but for the special circumstance of a very low price being paid
for it, it would have been held that it was not the kind of article
the buyer intended to buy.
'WHAT IS M=RCHANTABLNESS?
In a sense, any thing that has been sold, has been "mer-
chantable." The term is defined by the Standard Dictionary
"that can be bought or sold; fit to be sold; marketable." B
will sometimes buy a thing, because he supposes it to have qual-
ities which it does not have. Probably a thing is "merchant-
able" in the intended sense, when even when its properties are
known, there are constantly persons who will buy it, as being of
a certain species. But cantied corn which when cooked was
"sour, greasy and unfit for food," was nevertheless deemed
marketable. 8 Who, with knowledge of these properties would
buy such corn? What use would he expect to make of it? Yet
7155 Pa. 218.
18Boyd v. Wilson, 83 Pa. 319.
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in this case the court said "So long as the commodity is salable,
its different degrees of quality from good to bad are not the sub-
ject of an implied warranty. If it be wholly unmarketable, such'
as cannot be considered merchantable, probably' a different
conclusion would be reached, because an unmarketable thing
is substanfially di ferent in kind from one that is salable in
the market. In such a -case it is not the name merely which
governs; but the fact that it is without market value and
cannot reasonably be pronounced of the same kind as the
sample."' 9 Perhaps what is meant by merchantable, is, capable
of finding buyers who are aware 3f the actual properties of the
thing,. as often as it is offered for sale, as a thing of a certain
kiiid. If persons would buy as canned corn, corn which, when
cooked they knew would be unfit for food, though, possibly their
only reason for buying it would be, that they intended to sell it,
to those who were ignorant of its having this character, such
corn would be merchantable; or, if though unfit for food, some
persons with knowledge of its attributes would buy it for food it
would be merchantable.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN KIND AND QUALITY.
It is not to be wondered at that a distinction so vague as that
between kind and quality, between essential character and qual-
ity, should have provoked criticism. It is a distinction appar-
ently introduced by Borrekins v. Bevan,"° the opinion in which
is excessively disjointed, inconsequent and obscure. Gibson, C.
J., says of it "It seems to have little foundation in reason, and
little to recommend it on the score of certainty or convenience in
practice." He adds, "It is difficult to comprehend why the ven-
dee shall be taken to have bought on his own judgment as to
quality and not as to essence; nor will it be easy to say how far
a change may have been produced by adulteration so as to au-
thorize a jury to determine that the one denomination of the
article has ended and another begun.""
WHAT IS NOT A SALE BY SAMPLE.
When the goods, e. g., boxes of unpared evaporated peaches,
are in the presence of the vendee, when. the vendor offers to open
W9A similar thought is expressed in Selser v. Roberts, .xo5 Pa. 242.
2So says Gibson C. J.; Borrekins v. Bevan, 3 R. 23, and Woodward, J.,
Warren v. Phila. Coal Co., 83 Pa. 437.
2'Borrekins v. Bevan, 3 R. 23.
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them for the inspection of the vendee, who declines because the
examination would consume too much time, when instead the
vendee examines three or four (out of 100 boxes) and finding
them to be sound purchases the 100 boxes, it is error to allow
the jury to say that the sale was by sample, that thethree or four
boxes were "samples." The sale is rather by inspection.
"The goods in bulk, were on hand" says Clark, J., "and were
exhibited to the buyer. [No; the boxes, but not the contents
were so exhibited], their condition and quality were, it is ad-
mitted, readily ascertainable by inspection, and a full opportunity
to that end was afforded. * * * If it was inconvenient to
examine all, the buyer, if still unsatisfied should have protected
himself by a warranty."" A sells to B seven barrels of plumbago,
known to the trade as No. 6. Four months later, B visits A's
place of business and examines the plant and facilities and the
stock of plumbago. B then purchases ninety barrels of the stock
of plumbago on hand. That it was a sale by sample, says
Beaver; J., "is disproved, if that were necessary, by the visit and
inspection by one of the defendants who * * * * saw and
examined the identical stock from which the latter shipment was
made." ',
WHAT IS A SALF, BY SAMPLR.
Goods purchased by the vendee from the vendor, on a former
occasion, may be made the norm or standard, with which the
goods to be again furnished are to correspond; e. g. coal;' (the
vendor assuring the vendee it was of the same quality the vendee
had been buying, and the vendee's order being conditioned upon
its being of this quality) but, for some reason, B having already
bought of A a car load of window shade rollers, made from good
white pine, and from three and a half to four feet in length, and
ordering another caf load "of the same kind and quality," it wat
held that there was no warranty that the rollers in this load
should not be of a very inferior pine, and too short.' A, hav-
"Selser v. Roberts, 1o5 Pa. 242.
"2Walker v. Taylor, 19 Super. 39. Biddle J., told the jury "If the mah
said the sample was out of the same bin I do not think that means a war-
ranty or'anything at all." The counsel for the buyer seemed to desire to
treat the seven barrels as a sample. The court excluded evidence of the
-want of correspondence between the quality of the seven barrels and that
of the subsequently purchased plumbago.
"Warren v. Phila. Coal Co., 83 Pa. 437; Loyal Hanna Coal Co. v. Pem-
berton Co., 8 Lanc. 73.
"Coulston v. Nat. Bank, 4 W. N. 297.
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ing 850 cases of canned corn, showed B the contents of one can,
and furnished B with two other cans, the contents of which he
was to cook, and thus test at his home. B finding this corn good,
took all the corn. This was a sale by sample.2" Paint arriving
in Baltimore from London, A took. some of it as a sample to Phila-
delphia, and exhibited it to B. B came to no decision to buy at
that time, but what he said induced A to send the rest of the
paint to Philadelphia. A sale was then made to. B, which was
conditioned upon the paint "corresponding" with the sample."'
A exhibits oats to B and agrees that the. oats he will furnish
.shall "be in quality equal to the sample."8 There. may, it is
needless to suggest, be a sale at atictiob by warranty.' When a
sale is by sample, as well as by najme.and description, the sample
and not the name or. description is the standard to which the
thing furnished must conforrm.'
NO WARRAN'TY OF QUALITY.
When a sale was made by sample, that is, when a sample
was exhibited, but without express stipulation that it should .be
the standard not of kind merely, not of merchantableness, as of
that kind merely, but also of quality, there was implied at com-
mon law in this state, no warranty that thethingstobe furnished
to the vendee in fulfillment of the contract, should correspond -in
quality with the sample.3" "The rule is almost universal," said
Trunkey J., "that in a sale of goods by sample,- the vendor wai-
rants the quality -of the bulk to be equal to that of the sample.-
But, in Pennsylvania that rule is eschewed and a sale by sample
becomes a guaranty only that the article to be, delivered shall
follow its kind and be simply merchantable." '2 How absurd this
former Pennsylvania rule is, is discovered on very slight re-
flexion. When a man contracts to buy a thing which is not in
his presence, he must define it, more or less, with words. He
calls it a horse, or cow, or goat; iron, or copper or zinc. No one
ever imagined that when B ordered four horses, the order could
26Boyc V. Wilson, 83 Pa. 319.2 Borrekins'v. Bevan, 3 R. 23.
28Sims v. Striblen, 16 Phila. 9.2 9Barclay v. Tracy, 5 W. & S. 45.
3°Maute v. Gross, 56 Pa. 250.
31Boyd v. Wilson, 83 Pa. 319; Selser v. Roberts, xo5 Pa. 242; MiningCo. v. Jones, ro8 Pa. 55; Sydney School Furniture Co. v. School District,
44 Leg. Int. 82; 5 Cent. 306; Shaw v. Fleming, 174 Pa. 52.
32Mining Co. v. Jones, io8 Pa. 55.
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be filled by sending four steers, unless A ot B had at the time of
making the contract, exhibited, as a sample, a horse."3  The
sample could never have been necessary to define the kind, in so
far as kind is distinguishable otherwise than by quality. Qualities
are so very munmerous, and so incapable of verbal representation,
that a specinen, a model, or pattern, only can adequately por-
tray them. When then a sample is used, the understanding of
the parties would be, that it was intended to represent -n6t the
kind nerely,, not its merchantability merely, but the congeries
of its qualities.. So the universal intelligence interpreted the
act, Different interpretation of it was made by one or twoin-
tellects in Pennsylvania, to whom because of their official place,
othern felt constrained to show a deference. Relief from the im-
practicable and absurd rule could not be got from the court
which a half. century before adopted it,'and it was necessary for
the legislature to give it. Despite the former rule however there
were occasional judicial expressions which seemed to forget it.
Thus it was said that a sale of blue paint by sample was a war-
ranty that the substance furnished would "correspond with the
sample."'" Grapes being sold by sample, the trial judge -told the
jury without animadversion by the supreme court that the grapes
furnished must be "equal" to the sample. 5  A sale of superior
sweet scented Kentucky leaf -tobacco by sample was followed by
a delivery to the buyer of tobacco, which was Kentucky leaf to-
bacco, but was not the sweet scented nor superior. It was faded,
rotten and of very bad quality. The warranty was not broken,
however."
SAMPIE BXPR-SSLY MADE NORM OF QUALITY.
Parties can, with a few exceptions make such contracts as
they choose. If A wants to sell coal to B, and to condition B's
duty to receive and pay for it, on its possessing certain qualities
he is not forbidden to do so; nor is he forbidden to indicate a
3A sale under a denomination Was itself a warranty or condition that
the thing furnished should be of. that denomination. A sale, e. g., of "blue
paint" required the vendor to furnish blue paint. The sale by description
warrants that the article shall be of the kind ordered, and be merchantable,
Fogel v. Brubaker, 122 Pa. 7; Tete Bros. v. Eshler, ii Super. 224. A sale
of "tea" obliges the vendor to furnish an article that is salable under the
name "tea.!' Id.
'Borrekins v. Bevan, 3 R. 23.
3Barclay v. Tracy, 5 W. & S. 45.38Fraley v. Bispham, 10 Pa. 320.
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specimen of coal, and to say that the coal to be furnished by him
shall possess the same qualities, shall be like (in quality, no less
than in kind or merchantableness,) the coal used as a specimen.
Hence, although when nothing is said about the sample, it was
supposed to be intended only to represent the kind and merchant-
able state of the thing to be delivered by the vendor, if itwas
stipulated that the thing to be delivered should be like the sample
in other respects, conformity to it in these other respects by the
article to be furnished, was necessary. This principle has been
applied to coal, bought if like the sample,37 to lumber sold by a
sample to which it was to be similar "in character and quality"'
to oats, to be "in quality equal to the sample.,"' to cotton pick-
ings, agreed by B to be taken, if they "equaled the sample"
shown him by the vendor,"0 to iron-ore, bought by B, after test-
ing one car load sent him "quality of ore to be up to the sample
car load sent us'," to canned corn, the contents of seven cases
having been tested by the vendee and found satisfactory, and
the vendor agreeing or saying that the remainder should be of
the same quality," to tobacco, which, the buyer said, when buy-
ing was to "correspond with the sample,' 43 to roofing paper,
which was to be equal to a sample, with respect to its power to
absorb tar," to madras shirtings, to be furnished to correspond in
color and quality with the sample. 5 It is not to be expected
that the principle should be found to have been consistently ap-
plied. B having tried a carload of window shade rollers fur-
"
3Warren v. Philadelphia Coal Co., 83 Pa. 437.
,Johnston v. Sanger, 4. Walk. 458.
3
'Sims v. Striblen, 16 Phila. 9. In Jones v. Jennings, x68 Pa. 493, Jen-
nings ordered by letter "6o tons steel scrap similar to sample wagon load
delivered to us this A. M." This was a sale by sample.
40 Hoffman v. Burr, 155 Pa. 218.
"1Mining Co. v. Jones, xo8 Pa. 55.
42Boyd v. Wilson, 83 Pa. 319. dictum.
"Edwards v. Neill, i W. N. 40. The affidavit of defence dlleging this
fact and thd inferiority of the tobacco furnished was sufficient to prevent
judgment. But in Altoona Iron Works v. Axle Co., 6 W. N. 27z an affi-
davit was held insufficient which alleged-that the iron for whose price suit
was brought had been sold with the understanding that it should be "ac-
cording to samples supplied" by the vendee.
4.Hays v. Kingston, 23 W. N. 277. The sample paper absorbed one
and one-half times its own weight in tar. The paper furnished could ab-
sorb only twenty-one twentieths of its weight.
43Simpson v. Karr, 22 Super. 8.
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nished by A and found them satisfactory, ordered another car-
load "of the same kind and quality." An affidavit of defense,
in the suit by A for the price, was adjudged insufficient, although
it alleged that the rollers in the second car load were of lumber
very inferior to that of the rollers in the first car load, and that
many of them were shorter, and too short. 6 The color of bricks
may be warranted to correspond with that of the sample.'"
HOW EXPRESS IS THIS REFERENCE.
Apparently, the reference to the quality of the sample did
not always need to be very explicit. B requesting a sample of
lumber for molding for picture frames, it was sent, and there-
upon B ordered molding, making no reference to the sample. Be
described the wood as "your gum wood." An affidavit of de-
fense was held sufficient which alleged that the wood furnished
was not the kind used for molding, was not seasoned, was of
poor grain, bad color, and inferior quality, and in no respect like
the sample; was, some of it, what is known as "culls;" some of
second grade lumber.46 If the seller says the articles furnished
shall be of the same quality as the sample" or if the buyer or-
dets the article to be of the quality of the sample ' or, if it
is of the same quality" or, having seen the sample, says he will
buy the articles at the price named, and shortly afterwards the
vendor sends the articles, there is a warranty. 12 The use of the
word "warrant" is unnecessary.5 The agent of vendor warranted
that the goods should be like and as good as the sample.'
EVIDENCE OF MARKET VALUE.
In ascertaining whether iron ore furnished corresponded
with the sample, one witness may describe the sample; another
witness may testify to an analysis of the ore furnished; showing
its unfitness for "fix," its want of uniformity; its being badly
culled; its being mixed with much rock and inferior ore, but the
'Coulston v. Nat. Bank, 4 W. N. 297.
47Baltimore Brick Co. v. Coyle, 18 Super. 186.
48Tennesse Lumber Co. v. Garrison, xo Sadler, 67.
4"Boyd v. Wilson, 83 Pa. 319.
"°Boyd v. Wilson, 83 Pa. ag; Mining Co. v. Jones, io8 Pa. 55-
5'Warren v. Phila. Coal Co., 83 Pa. 437.
5
2 Hoffman v. Burr, 155 Pa. 218.
-
3Warren v. Phila. Coal Co., 83 Pa. 437.
"1 ryrrell v. R .ckvell. 2 C. P. 223. The goods furnished were shelf-
wQrn and unsalable. This was a breach of warranty.
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character of a quantity of ore taken from the vendor's place of
business, a year after the contract in question is irrelevant.'
So doubtless, since market value can be known only by a knowl-
edge of the properties of the ore, and by a knowledge of the
value in the market of ores having these properties, one man
could testify to the properties of ore in question, and another to
the market value of such an ore. An expert may testify for the
vendee, sued for the price, as to his opinion. concerning the ne-
nessity of uniformity in the character or classification of ores
used in the manufacture of iron, in order to have good results.
This opinion will assist in determining the market value of the
ore.
OTHER LOSSuS.
Whether the vendee can, besides avoiding paying the con-
tract price of the thing, or anything more than the market value
of it, recover for losses arising from his use of it, before he be-
came aware of its bad properties, or for damages which he may
have incurred by selling it, with warranty, or representations to
another, the cases on sale by sample do not distinctly decide.
If B, the vendee of worsted yarn, in turn sells it to C, and A,
the primary vendor makes some arrangement with C, by which C
is induced to continue to use the yarn, on A's promise to indem-
nify him for any loss thereout arising, B will not be entitled as
set-off, when sued on the contract by A, to the sum which A is
bound to pay to C.56 In Warren v. Pennsylvania Coal Co.' an
action for the price of coal, it was shown that the defendant in
buying inquired particularly of the quality of the coal. The
vendor's agent assured him that it was of the same quality as he
had been buying. He then said to the agent "if so, to put it on
the wharf at four dollars per ton, but, if it was not good coal, I
[he] would noi have it." From this evidence Woodward, J.,
says the jury might have found an agreement on the part of the
vendor to be answerable for the quality of the coal. The de-
fendants then offered to show that the coal delivered hindered
and delayed them in their business, and that they suffered loss
thereby; that the coal was bought to be used in raising steam at
a paper mill, as the vendors-knew, and that it was unfit for that
65 Mining Co. v. Jones, ro8 Pa. 55.
-Shaw v. Fleming, 143 Pa. w04.
5783 Pa. 437.
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purpose. The rejection of this offer was justified on the ground
that it was made "upon the assumption of a legal inrfplication of
a warranty, arising from a [the?] single fact of the sale itself."
The justice seems to intimate that, if there was no warranty of
quality, the evidence was inadmissible, and if there was a war-
ranty, the evidence should have been admitted. When the offer
was made, the evidence was already in, from which, the justice
concedes, the jury might have inferred a warranty. Then, why
was the evidence not receivable? The unintelligible language of
the justice fails to enlighten us. Would a vendor, selling with
warranty, coal, which he knows is bought to be used in a cer-
tain way, be liable for losses arising from the attempt by the
vendee, to use it in this way, before discovering its unfitness? The
case called for an answer to this question, but the decision gives
none.
FRAUD IN INDUCING ASSENT TO SAMPLE.
The vendor may induce the vendee, or the vendee the vendor,
to adopt the sample by means of a trick or fraud. When the
fraud is upon the vendee, he will not be obliged to accept and
pay for a material, e. g. lubricating oil, that is inferior to the
kind the vendor knew that he intended to buy. B agreed to ac-
cept in payment of a debt, due by A, oil, at a certain price per
barrel. The oil was to be like that furnished by A to the House
of Refuge, and the certain iron works in the city of Philadelphia.
In order to designate the oil, in the written contract, A under-
took to procure a bottle of the oil intended. He procured a bottle
of a very inferior sort, worth only sixteen cents per gallon, in-
stead, as he represented, $1.80. B was not bound to accept oil
like that in the bottle.58 If A, offering 850 cases of canned
corn, selected three cans from them, the contents of which
were known by him to be in good condition, and submitted them
to B, as samples, and B, finding them good, bought the rest, B
would not be bpund to accept and pay for them if they were in
fact seriously inferior to the sample. So, if there were two lots
of corn, one inferior to-the other, and A selected as a sample of
the inferior lot a specimen from the superior lot, this would be
fraud."
58Maute v. Gross, 56 Pa. 25o.
9uoyd v. Wilson, 83 Pa. 3x9, dicta, Cf. Sims v. Striblen, x6 Phila. 9.
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MODEL FOR MANUFACTURE.
If B orders from a manufacturer, A, the manufacture of cer-
tain articles, e. g. gas generators ° or books,"' furnishing a
model or sample, and ordering the articles "as per sample
shown," the articles must correspond with the sample in essen-
tial particulars. The fact that the gas generator furnished will
not produce the effect which the model produces, may be shown
as evidence that it does not correspond with the model. If like
the model in essential respects, it will produce the same effects.
Direct evidence of want -of correspondence with the model, e. g.
difference of shape of perforated case; difference in respect to the
movableness of the chimney, in the length of the burner tube,
and of the wick-tube is receivable.62 In Gallagher v. Philadel-
phia, the Bureau of Gas of the city ordered 110 meter inspector
street books, with 200 leaves each; paper Whiting Standard
Ledger, 22 lbs. They were to be crown bound, .in full American
Russia leather, sewed with extra heavy thread, on two extra
heavy bands, "paper and binding to be fully equal to sample
shown in every particular." In the suit for the contract price,
it was held that the use of paper with the water mark "Whiting
Linen Ledger" was not a breach of the Contract, if the makers of
the Whiting Standard Ledger had changed the name of the same
paper to WhitingStandard Linen. It was also held that the with-
drawal by the city, of its model books, before the completion of the
manufacture, excused the manufacturer for deviations from it in
unimportant details, e.g. in using three binding stitches instead of
four, a book with three stitches being proved to be "equal to the
sample shown," in strength.' The model may be modified by
agreement of the parties, and then the maker must conform to
the modified model."
CUSTOM.
That the liability imposed by the law, in the absence of a
contract of parties, may be varied by tihe terms of the contract,
6°Tlton v. Miller, 66 Pa. 388.
6
'Gallagher v. Philadelphia, 9 Super 498.
62Tilton v. Miller, 66 Pa. 388.
3The specifications required sirhply that the books be "sewed with
extra heavy thread, on two extra heavy bands." They did not specify the
number of stitches unless the words "fully equal to the sample shown in
every particular" was such a specification.
"Tilton v. Miller, 66 Pa. 388.
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is a principle too well established to need vindication. Even
when a mere contract of sale imposed no liability upon the
vendor for the quality, he could agree to warrant and thus create
that liability. So, selling by sample, lie could agree that the
thing sold should have the qualities of the sample, and thus make
himself liable should it not have them. Could the assumption
of such a liability be effected through a custom? In 1831, it was
held that a vendee of cotton could recover damages for its latent
defects, although there was no warranty or fraud on the part of
the vendor, if there was a custom of trade in Philadelphia, where
the sale was made, that the vendor should answer to the vendee
for such defects.' Gibson C. J., dissented because the local cus-
toms were "in derogation of the general law." But there is no
law, either-general or special, that the vendor shall not be liable,
if he is willing to contract to be, nor is there a law, general or
special, that a custom, in view of which parties contract, may
not be proved in order to prove what they have contracted to do;
in particular, in order to prove that in addition to what they
have said or written, they have contracted thus and thus. In
Wetherill v. Neilson," there was an effort to prove a custom in
Philddelphia, with respect to soda ash, to the effect that the ven-
dor, if he represents the percentage of soda therein, is bound to
make the representation good, although he neither warrants nor
commits a fraud. Lowrie, J., approved of the exclusion of the
evidence. Conceding the admission of a similar custom in Snow-
den v. Warder, he professes to be unable to follow the example.
Adopting C. 3. Gibson's thoughts he says, "If we admit evi-
dence of this special custom we allow the law to be changed (!)
by the testimony of witnesses, or by the soda dealers of Phila-
delphia." As well say that when a contract is made, it changes
the law, because it changes the legal obligations of the parties.
His other objection is, that "The custom, if respected at all,
must be regarded as part of the contract, whether written or
verbal, and then their uncertainty [i. e. that of contracts] is ap-
parent." But objection-on this ground has not prevailed. In
Boyd v. Wilson6t a suit for the price of 850 cases of canned corn,
6Snowden v. Warder, 3 R. iox.
62o Pa. 448.
683 Pa. 319. The supreme court said nothing on the subject. In
Hoffman v. Burr, 155 Pa. 218, an action for the price of cotton pickings, it
appeared that the vendee instead of examining them at the wharf moved
them from the wharf to his warehouse. He there found them defective.
Proof wasreceived by Hare,P. J.,of acustom that if thepparchaserdid notex-
amine goods at the wharf, if he subsequently found them defective, he could
not, though there was a warranty, recover the cost of transportation.
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evidence was received of a custom among dealers in canned fruits
in Philadelphia, not to exact payment for defective fruit, to al-
low its return, and to refund the price paid, or to furnish a' sound
commodity. Briggs, J., stated to the jury the properties which
such a custom had to possess, in order that it might affect the
rights and liability of a vendor.
WAIVER OF STRICT CONFORMITY WITH SAMPLE.
The vendee may preclude himself from taking advantage, by
refusing to accept the articles and to pay forthem, or by demand-
ing an abatement of the price, of the departure of the articles
from the standard. B ordered 23,000 bricks, to be in color and
otherwise, like a sample brick. They were sent in three par-
cels, at intervals. The first and second parcels were received
without complaint, and retained for a considerable time. The
vendee urged the sending of the remainder. The remainder
came. If the vendee could not be obliged to accept and pay for
the remainder, he was liable in damages for not accepting them.
He was also liable for the contract price of the bricks in the first
two parcels68
THE ACT OF APRIL 13TH 1887.
The act of 1887 provides that "In all sales by sample, un-
less the parties shall agree otherwise, there shall be an implied
warranty on the part of the seller, that the goods, chattels and
property sold and to be delivered are the same in quality as the
sample shown." 'It is intimated that the departure from the
quality of the sample, must be "material" in order to violate the
warranty. 9 The 494th section of the German Civil Code, which
went into effect on January 1st, 1900, enacts that "In a sale ac-
68Baltimore Brick Co. v. Coyle, 18 Super 186. The vendor hadpaid the
expense of the transmission of the bricks. When the third parcel arrived,
the vendee notified the vendor that he would not retain any of the bricks.
6Baltimore Brick Co. v. Coyle, 18 Super 186 (color of bricks). In Syd-
ney School Furniture Co. v. School District, 44 Leg. Int. 82; 5 Cent. 3o6,
Green, J., says the rule that a sale by sample did not imply a warranty of
quality has "been enforced many times in circumstances of great .hardship
to the purchaser and not without a feeling of reluctance on the part of the
courts in view of its apparent lack of justice in particular cases." But the
courts invented the rule and 'efused to abolish it. In Loyal Hanna Coal
Co., v. Penna. Iron (o., 8 Lanc. 74, a sale of coal by sample since the act of
1887, was held to imply a warranty of correspondence in quality with the
sample. Cf. also, Nelms v. Heintsh, 13 Lanc. 6z, where was a sale by
sample of Clinton goods for painters' use.
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cording to sample, or according to pattern, the qualities of the
sample or pattern are deemed to have been warranted."
CASES IN' WHICH SAMPLES HAVE BEN USED.
Samples have been used in sales of a great variety of things,
some of which are here enumerated: unpared evaporated peaches 0
barrels of plumbago," grapes," lubricating oil,"3 iron ore,7' cans
of corn," coal," blue paint," boxes of raisins-,8 fancy chromatic
cards," Kentucky leaf tobacco,' roofing paper,8' gum lumber for
moldings,82 Worsted yarn,' oats,8 cotton pickings," bricks,"
madras shirtings."
VINDEE'S RPMEDI S FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY.
Vendee does not accept the goods.
When goods are ordered to correspond with a sample, the ven-
dee may, if they do not correspond, reject them, and thus escape all
liability for the price or value.' This complete escape of the vendee
from pecuniary liability, was realized by the purchaser of cotton
pickings, which when sent, were found by him to be inferior to
the sample with which they were to correspond." In such a case,
2 Selser v. Roberts, io5 Pa. 242.
"
1Walker v. Taylor, 39 Super 39.
72Barclay v. Tracy, 5 W. & S. 45.
73Maute v. Gross, 56 Pa. 250.
72Mining Co. v. Tones, xo8 Pa. 55.
15Boyd v. Wilson, 83 Pa. 319.
2 8Warren v. Phila. Coal Co., 83 Pa. 437.
2 Borrekins v. Bevan, 3 R. 23.
78Badeau v. Auerbach, 2 W. N. 223.
1gHaddock v. Mayer, 38 Leg. Int. 31!.
80Fraley v. Bispham, 1o Pa. 320; Strauss v. Welsh, 22 Super 437.
81Hays v. Kingston, 23 W. N. 277.
81Tennessee Lumber Co. v. Garrison, io Sadler 67.
"Shaw v. Fleming, 174 Pa. 52; (Also 143 Pa. 104; 9 Sadler, 457.)
*Sims v. Striblen, x6 Phila. 9.
"Hoffman v. Burr, 155 Pa., 218.
86Baltimore Brick Co. v. Coyle, 18 Super 186.
81Simpson v. Karr, 22 Super 8.
"Tete Bro. v. Eshler, ix Super, 224; Dailey v. Green, 15 Pa, 118, 126.
"Hoffman v. Burr, 155 Pa. 218. Sixty tons of steel scrap being sent by
railroad, which was agent of the vendor, there must be an acceptance by the
vendee, in order to entitle the vendor to the priae. Without such accept-
ance, he can recover damages only for breach of the contract. Jones v.
Jennings, 168 Pa. 493.
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the vendee is not bound to show the market value of the goods,
for he is not bound to pay it. If he seasonably notifies the ven-
dor that he declines to retain the goods and that he holds them at
the disposal of the vendor, this person must suffer the loss should
they be destroyed by fire, before their removal from the vendee's
property. " Some only of the things furnished may be inferior.
If the vendee'accepts, e. g. 18,000 bricks of 23,000, and retains
them, he is not for that reason compelled to accept the remaining
5,000, if they are below the sample." Sale of wrapper tobacco.
Some of 'it was fould to be 'bad, but the vendee was deterred
from returning it, by the promise of the vendor that, if he would
keep and use as much as he could, he should not be charged for
so much as he could not use. He could not be compelled to pay
for so much as he could not use.9" Sale of madras shirtings,
which in color and quality were to correspond with a sample.
One installment did not correspond but the vendee retained it on
the promise of the vendor, of a reduction of price for any loss,
and that the future instalments should correspond with the
sample. Future instalments being inferior, the vendee could
refuse to receive them, and escape the payment of any thing.
Sale of 5,000 tons of iron ore to be delivered, 500 tons per month.
If after some of it has been received and -retained, later instal-
ments prove to be inferior to the sample, the vendee may reject
them and decline to pay anything."4 A having agreed to accept
from B, his judgment debtor, lubricating oil of a certain quality,
in payment of the judgment, is not bound to accept oil inferior
to the standard agreed upon, and if such inferior oil is tendered,
may rejecting it, compel payment in money.'
When vendee accepts the goods.
When the vendee accepts the goods, he does not i4so facto
bind himself to pay the contract price for them. 1-is acceptance
is not conclusive that the gQods are as they were warranted to
be, nor does it estop him from showing that they are inferiot to
the sample. And if the goods are shown to be inferior to the
90 d.
9"Baltimore Brick Co. v. Coyle 18 Super. j86.
"Straus v. Welsh, 29 Super. 437.
9$Simpson v. Karr, 22 Super. 8.
'"Mining Co. v. Jones, io8 Pa. 55.
"5Maute v" Gross, 56 Pa. 25o.
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sample, in an action for the purchase money, the vendee will
have a right to a reduction from the price, but not to exemption
from the duty of any payment whatever.96 The vendor may re-
cover the actual market value of the thing furnished, less any ad-
missible losses that may be the proximate result of the supply of
an inferior thing. In a suit" for the balance of purchase money of
roofing paper, the affidavit set up that the inferior quality of the
paper, caused a loss equal to thirty per cent of the price, or more
than the residue of the purchase money sued for. It was error to
enter judgment for the plaintiff, for the full amount claimed, but
how much, if any, could have been recovered, was not con-
sidered by the supreme court. In Mining Company v. Jones"8 it
is apparently assumed, the action being for the contract price of
iron ore, that the defendant could deduct from the contract price
as damages the difference between the contract price and the
market value; that is, that the plaintiff could recover the market
value. The court awkwardly lays down the rule that the de-
fendant may "set-off or recoup," as against the contract price,
the difference between that price and the market value of the
ore," simply a round about way of saying that, as the defendant
did not get what he contracted for he is not bound to pay the
contract price, but as he did get something he is bound to pay
the market value of" what lie got. In Selser v. Robertse a suit
for the price of unpared evaporated peaches, the vendee al-
leged that they were some of them unmerchantable and claimed
$212 as a set-off, having sold them at a loss of that amount.
This the trial court allowed; but the supreme court reversed be-
cause it found no warranty of quality. Possibly the theory was
that the resale, on which a loss of $212 was suffered, was satis-
factory evidence of the actual market value of the peaches.
9 Tete Bros. v. Eshler, ii Super. 224; Baltimore Brick Co. v. Coyle,
18 Super. 186.
97Hays v. Kingston, 23 W. N. 277.
9sioS Pa. 55. It is said to be incompetent to prove the difference in
value between the sample and the ore, because the affidavit of defence had
indicated another measure, and it was by the rule of the court, conclusive.
93xo1 Pa. 242. In Johnston v. Sanger, 4 Walker, 458, it was held that if
the vendee of lumber accepted it, and retained it, he could not avoid paying
the contract price, unless he had been induced to accept by some fraud;
but this must be error. In Loyal Hanna Coal Co. v. Penn. Iron Co., 8
Lanc, 73, the vendee having kept the coal, which was unequal to the sample,
was entitled to a "set-off," i. e. to the difference of value and price.
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MARKET VALUE WHEN?
As the defendant has not ordered the.goods, inferior to the
sample, and may reject them and thus avoid all liability for
them, he becomes liable for any thing only by accepting what is
furnished him, or by such conduct as may be equivalent to an ac-
ceptance. Hence, the market value of the goods, e. g. iron ore,
at the time of the acceptance of it will be what the defendant
must pay. But if the vendee has been delayed in making a final
decision whether to accept or reject after the receipt of the goods,
by the representations and inducements of the vendor the date
of the final decision, not of the receipt of the goods will be the
date the market value at which will be the sum which the ven-
dee must pay.' The contract is then made.
INTEREST ON THE MARKET VALUE.
Even when the things furnished. e. g. iron ore, have not
corresponded with the sample, and the duty of paying for them
depends on the .acceptance of them, and, even when accepted,
the sum to be paid is, not the contract price, but the market value,
the jury must allow interest on this market value from the time
of the acceptance, which constituted the contract. It is error to
permit the jury to allow interest or not in its discretion. "A bona
fide dispute as to the amount of indebtedness is no bar to the
accruing of interest."'
DELAY IN RETURN OF GOODS.
When goods are sent to a vendee, as if in pursuance of a con-
tract of purchase, it is his duty to examine them in a reasonable
time, and, finding them below the standard fixed in the contract,
to return them. He cannot retain them for an indefinite time,
and then return them. The thing sold being tea, a retention of
it for four months, before offering to return, is unreasonable.
The vendee must be treated as having accepted and his only right
when stied for the price will be to escape paying the contract
price, and to pay only what the tea was worth.' A delay of sixty
or ninety days in returning so-called Clinton goods, for painters'
'Mining Co. v. Jones, io8 Pa. 55. The principle stated by the trial
judge (p. 61), is not rejected by Trunkey, J., but only its applicability under
the evidence (p. 68).
2Mining Co. v. Jones, io8 Pa. 55.
3Tete Bros. v. Eshler, il Super. 224: Hoffman v. Burr, 155 Pa. 218.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
use, was held unreasonable. A week or ten days would have
been allowed. Delay may be made reasonable by circumstances
e. g. the failure of the vendor to send a bill to the vendee.'
EVIDENCE OF NON-CONFORMITY WITH SAMPLE.
A sale of "steel scrap similar to sample wagon load" already
delivered to the vendee having been made, it is said that an
analysis of the steel scrap sent in fulfillment of the contract,
demonstrated that it did not correspond in quality with the
sample. There was however, evidence that it was taken from
the same pile and was similar in external appearance. The
vendor denied, and the vendee affirmed that the similarity *or
dissimilarity was to be determined by the analysis. It was sub-
mitted to the jury to determine and the jury determined that the
analysis was not the decisive test, and that the scrap furnished
was "similar"to the sample; i.e. apparently, that' 'similar" did not
mean similar in chemical constitution, but in external appearance,
and in respect to the identity of the pile from which both sample
and scrap furnished were taken. McCollum, J., says, we must
assume, therefore, for the purposes of our present inquiry, that
the material which the defendants (vendee) refused to accept
was such as the contract called for.' '
VENDOR'S REMEDY.
When the sale is of goods not specified at the time of mak-
ing the contract, if, when they are sent to the vendee, he rejects
them, because they are, as in fact they are, inferior to the sample
which they are warranted to equal, the vendor can recover noth-
ing. If the goods do correspond with the sample, and they are
nevertheless rejected, the vendor cannot recover the contract
price, but only damages for the vendee's breach.'
SUIT ON THE WARRANTY.
The breach of the warranty can be shown not only when the
vendee is sued for the price of the thing sold, but also when a
direct action is brought upon the warranty itself. The vendee
may have paid the 'purchase money in full, or he may have paid
4Nelmes v. Heintsh, 13 Lanc. 62.
5Jones v. Jennings, 168 Pa. 493- Whether there was parol evidence
bearing on the meaning of the word "silnilar" and why the jury, not the
court, interpreted a writing, does not appear.
6jones v. Jennings, ,8 Pa. 493. In Nelms v. Heintsh, 13 Lanc. 62, it
seems to be assumed that the contract price can be recovered.
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more of it than he was equitably bound to pay. He may then
sue on the warranty in assumpsit. If the vendor is a foreign
corporation, its property in this state is subject to a foreign at-
tachment by the vendee. The action, says Allison, P.J., "is not
to recover damages for deceit or misrepresentation, but for non-
compliance by the defendants with their contract made with the
plaintiffs. The remedy in a case of this character, is not by ac-
tion ex deliclo, nor is it for a tort for which foreign attachment
will not lie."' The action on the warranty is not for a rescission
of the contract, and therefore can be sustained without a return
of the goods, or a tender of them, to the vendor.9
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENCE.
In a large number of cases, the absence of a warranty from
the sale by sample has been adjudicated, in considering the suffi-
ciency of an affidavit of defence. If the affidavit alleged a con-
tract that the articles furnished should correspond with the
sample, and that they did not so correspond, it was sufficient;"°
if it alleged simply a sample, and that the goods were in quality
inferior to it, it was insufficient." Under a rule of court which
confines the defence, at the trial to matters averred as a defence
in the affidavit, if the affidavit fixes a measure of damages, the
defendant is limited to that measure.
12
'Borrekins v. Bevan, 3 R. 23; Sims v. Striblen, 16 Phila. 9.
"Sims v. Striblen, 16 Phila 9.
9Borrekins v. Bevan, 3 R. 23.
'
0Simpson v. Karr, 22 Super. 8; Strauss v. Welsh, 29 Super. 437; Tyr-
rell v. Rockwell, 2 C. P. 223
"Badeau v. Auerbach, 2 W. N. 223; Altoona Iron Works v. Axle Co.,
6 W. N. 271; Haddock v. Mayer, 38 Leg. Int. 311; Edwards v. Neill, r W.
N. 4o; Hays v. Kingston, 23 W. N. 277: Tennessee Lumber Co. v. Garrison,
xo Sadler 67; Shaw v. Fleming, 9 Sadler, 457.
"2Mining Co. v. Jones, ioS Pa. 55.
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MOOT COURT.
WILLIAM BARSH v. JOHN TENDRAL.
Execution of Wills.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
John Hollopan, about to die, called two friends to his bedside, and
bade one of them write what he dictated. One of them seized a lead
pencil and a scrap of paper and wrote, "All my property when I die I
give to my nephew, John Tendral." This was read to Hollopan, who
nodded assent to it. He was asked to sign it, made an effort to seize the
pencil, when he fell back into his pillow and expired. This will was ad-
mitted to probate on July 3d, 1891. Doubting its validity Barsh, another
nephew, claiming an undivided half of the land by descent, brings this
ejectment on August 11th, 1907.
Kinard for the Plaintiff.
Fetterhoof for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
KOPYSCIANSKI, J.:- "Every will shall be in writing and unless
the person making the same shall be prevented by his last sickness, shall
be signed by him at the end thereof, or by some person in his presence,
and by his expressed direction, and in all cases shall be proved by the
oaths and affirmations of two or more competent witnesses, otherwise
such will shall be of no effect. Act April 8, 1833."
It appears that John Hollopan was of a sound and disposing mind
and memory, called two friends to his bedside, and bade one of them to
write what he dictated. One of them seized a lead pencil and a scrap of
paper and wrote "All my property when I die I give to my nephew,
John Tendral." This was read to him, who nodded an assent to it. He
made an effort to seize the pencil and sign it, when he fell back into his
pillow and expired. This wds admitted to probate July 3, 1891.
The question is whether this will falls within the saving or excep-
tions in the Act of April 8, 1833.
In Covett's Appeal, 8 W. and S. 25, Chief Justice Gibson intimated
that a liberal interpretation should be given to the Act of 1833.
The Act of 1833 directs and requires that the will shall be signed at
the end thereof with the name of the testator subscribed by himself or
by another by his express direction and in his presence unless prevented
by the severity of his last sickness.
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I take it that when and so long as a man has physical power and
ability to affix his own signature, however serious his illness, he is not
bound to call in the aid of another, but that his name subscribed by his
oven hand is in such case the signature the law contemplates, but it is
possible that while making an effort to sign it, such physical power may
be suddenly and unexpectedly taken from him, and he may be surprised
by the extremity of his death, with no intervals in which the expressed
direction to another to sign for him could be given. It does not appear
that Hollopan could give the direction after falling back into his pillow,
nor is it it alleged by the plaintiff that he could. I think the case clearly
comes within the exceptions and saving of the Actoof April 8, 1883.
Showers v. Showers, 27 Pa. 385.
The cases cited by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, especially
Stricker v. Grove, 5 Wharton 397, upon which he laid so much stress, I
have considered, but cannot see how they could apply to the case at bar.
Here the putative testator being personally unable to sign had time and
opportunity to ask another, but failed to do it. The will failed, and Chief
Justice Rogers therein says : "If the paper be not signed it is un-
necessary to argue. Why it is not signed unless the omission to execute
the instrument arises from mental imbecility or bodily infirmity of the
testator, a total incapacity on his part either to sign the paper or to
give the required direction to others."
Dunlap v. Dunlap, 10 Watts 153. The point decided was a mere in-
ferential direction to sign. The hand of the putative testator had been
guided in tracing his signature while he was lying in a state of insensi-
bility That would not meet the requirement in the statute of an express
direction to sign because ratification is only an equivalent for authority
by implication.
The testator in the case at bar while making an effort to. sign was
surprised by the supervention of an inability to sign. There was no
moment in which the testator could make a request of another, by reason
of suddenness and completeness of the prostration of physical and men-
tal powers. I think the case clearly falls within the exception or saving
clause of the act.
The will being valid, the action of ejectment fails.
Judgment for defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The will was written by'another than the testator. Itisnot for that
reason invalid. Being written, it was read to the testator. His own
perushl of it is not necessary. He may be iliterate, and, therefore, un-
able to read, or he may be blind, or extreme feebleness may make read-
ing irksome. Assent to the will is normally expressed by the subscrip-
tion by the testator or of some one at his direction and in hispresence of
his m rk or name. But the statute does not requiie this where the tes-
tator is "prevented by the extremity of his last sickness." Here, Hollo-
pan nodded assent to the will, as read to him, but did not write his name,
nor call on others to write it. He made no effort to take the pencil, but
immediately fell back into his pillow and expired. This surely was pre-
vention of signing by the extremity of last sickness.
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Capacity to sign or to direct others to sign, is presumed. When the
Sill is offered for probate, and it is found by the register to be un-
signed, he must reject it, unless evidence of the excusatory facts is given
to him. His probate of it, without such evidence in his record, would be
void. Funston's Estate, 24 Pa. C. C. 135. But the record of the probate
shows that the incapacity of the testator to sign, was proved before the
register. He had jurisdiction. His decision on the credibility of the
witnesses, and on the truth of their testimony is conclusive. It could
not now, after the lapse of three years, Act June 20th, 1895, be assailed
by appeal to the Orphans' Court. It could not be assailed at any time
in ejectment. Wilson v. Gaston
, 
92 Pa. 207. Cf. Smith v. Beales, 33
Super. 570.
Judgment affirmed.
WM. BARTON vs. JOHN ADArlSON.
Riparian Owners. Damming Water.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Adamson and Barton are riparian owners on opposite sides of the
stream. The spring thaws, for some years back, have regularly flooded
the lands of both. Adamson erects a wall on his land along side of the
stream to prevent flooding, and as a result, the flood encroaches on Bar-
ton's land to a greater extent than formerly, to B's damage. This is
trespass by Barton for damages.
Branch for the plaintiff.
Jeakias for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
GOLDSTEIN, J.-The. question to be decided is whether or not the
waters of a stream which has been caused to overflow by rains and melt-
ing snow are to be considered surface water or a part of the original
watercourse.
In Pennsylvania. it has not been decided, and in other jurisdictions
the authorities are in conflict, but from the facts in the case and sur-
rounding circumstances we will endeavor to decide the question not only
upon legal, but on equitable grounds.
In Fry vs. Warne 29 Wis., it was said: "A water course consists of
bed, banks and water; yet water need not flow continually; and there are
many watercourses which are sometimes dry. To maintain the right to
a watercourse or brook it must be made to appear that the water usually
flows in a certain direction, and by a regular channel with banks and
sides. It need not be shown to flow continually, and it may at times be
dry, but it must have a well defined and substantial existence."
In the case before us we are of the opinion that when the water
overflowed it had no bed or banks, and it affirmatively appears that there
is also wanting the usual flow of water which is an essential element of
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a water course. The flow of water is the exception and not the rule. It
occurs only in times of freshets, or after considerable rains and is exclus-
ively surface water.
In Miller vs. Sauback, 47 Pa., 154, Thompson, J., said: No doubt
the owner of land through which a stream flows may incrmase the volume
of water by draining into it without any liability to damages by a lower
owner. He must abide the contingency of increasing or diminishing the
flow in the channel, because the upper riparian owner has the right to
all the advantages of drainage or irrigation as reasonable use of the
stream may give. If he can drain the water from his land into the stream
we see no good reason why he may not erect a wall so that the water
cannot overflow his land, and thus avoid the necessity of having to drain
it off afterwards.
If the plaintiff has suffered any damage it is "dammum abseque in-
juria. " There is no such thing known to the law as a right to any par-
ticular flow of surface water, "jure naturae." The owner of the land
may at his pleasure withhold the water flowing on his property from
passing in its natural course on to that of his neighbor, and in the same
manner may prevent the water falling on the land of the latter from
coming on to his own. Neither the right to discharge, nor to receive the
surface water can have any legal existence except from a grant, ex-
pressed or implied.
Bowlsby vs. Speer 31 N. J. L., 852 J. Hough in Munkres vs. Kansas
City, etc., R. R. Co 72 Mo. said: "A water course is a stream or brook
having a definite channel for the conveyance of water. It may be made
up, more or less, from surface water from rains and melting snow, but
after it enters into a channel and commences to flow in its natural banks,
it is no longer to be considered surface water."
Morton, C. J., in Rathke vs. Gardner 134 Mass. 14. As between the
owners of contiguous estates, it is settled in this Commonwealth that the
right of an owner of land to occupy and improve it as he may see fit, ei-
ther by erecting structures or by changing the surface, is not restricted
by the fact that such use of his own land will cause surface water to flow
over adjoining lands in greater quantities, or in other directions. than
they were accustomed to flow. If, by this use, the adjoining land is
damaged, it is "dammum obsque injuria."
Such water is practically surface water. It occupies, temporarily,
land used for other purposes. The right to divert or impede its flow is
quite different from the right to divert or impede the flow of water in its
channel. Overflowed water is an outlaw, tending to interfere with the
legitimate use of land which it overflows. In natural progress of im-
provements it may be expected that it will become more and more re-
stricted.
In some jurisdictions water which overflows the banks of water-
courses by reason of the insufficiency of the channel to carry off all the
water are declared to be surface waters.
(1). Morris vs. Council Bluff, 67 Iowa 346.
(2). Jones vs. St. Louis, etc., R. Co.; 84 Mo., 151.
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After flood waters have lost all connection with the watercourses and
cannot return thereto as the water subsides they should be unquestion-
ably considered as surface waters. -Muckels vs. Kansas City, etc. R. Co.,
72 Mo., 514.
It is important to note the distinction recognized by all courts be-
tween water within the banks of a natural stream, and water which in
times of freshets overflows the boundary of the natural and ordinary
chanel of the stream and rests or flows outside such boundary and upon
the land adjacent thereto. Such overflowing water upon lands outside of
the natural banks of the stream is recognized and classified as surface
water. This recognition and classification is uniform. (See Shane vs.
Kansas City R. Co., 71 Mo. 238.
All waters from rain, melted snow, etc., wherever found outside the
natural banks of a stream are surface waters, to be absolutely appro-
piiated, if he sees fit, by the one on whose land it is found, or if he pre-
fers to be fenced out or embanked against to keep it off his land; as it is
regarded as the common enemy against which all are authorized to pro-
tect themselves, as the necessity of the case may require. Overflow
water is subject to the rules governing surface water to the .extent that
it cannot be concentrated in a single channel and cast on to the land of
a lower proprietor. McCormick v. Kansas City, etc. R; Co., 70 Mo. 359.
Flood water which has spread over the surrounding country is surface
water. Schlider vs. Northern Pac. R. Co., 29 Mo. app. 68.
We are of the opinion that when the stream overflowed its banks by
reason of the spring thaws and freshet$, the water so overflowing upon
the lands of the plaintiff and defendant respectively constituted no part
of the natural channel or water course. The rains occurring during the
spring, and for such a brief period of time are not of such a character as
to be defined as a water course. They are of a casual or vagrant char-
acter following no definite course and having no substantial or perma-
nent existence, and which are lost by being diffused over the surface of
the ground, through percolation into the soil, and by evaporation. They
d& not return to the natural channel, but on the contrary, where a stream
has become swolen by reason of rains and melting snow, the surplus
water flows over adjoining lands and disappears by sinking into the earth
and by evaporation caused by the heat of the sun. They do not have the
"animus revertendi." The surplus water-is not a portion of the water-
course, and to constitute a water course the flow of water must possess
that unity of character by which the flow on one persons land could be
identified with that on his neighbor's land. To maintain the right to a
watercourse it must be made to appear that the water usually flows in a
certain directionand by a regular channel with banks and sides. It must
have.a well defined and substantial existence.-Asbley vs. Walcott, 11
Cush. 192.
The proprietary interests of one man in the. land of another is the
'legal right" which the law requires the owner of land to so regard that
it shall not be injured or destroyed in the use of property otherwise law-
ful. An analysis of the decisions relative to the obstruction of streams
will show that they necessarily rest on this rule of servitude, creating,
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so far as the bed of the stream is concerned, the "legal rights" of one
man in the land of another man. The low grounds adjacent to a river,
but outside of its well defined banks, do not owe any servitude to the
waters resulting from rain, etc., in time of freshets, which do not flow
within such banks, but which are found on such adjacent lands.
If such servitude is imposed by the law, it is perpetual in its obliga-
tions. It condemns these lands to unending slavery, as the receptacle
of waste, irregular, useless and vagrant waters. It is a lasting prohibi-
tion to the improvement and utilization of such lands, and to any change,
in lands themselves by which the capacity of such lands to hold the water
will be decreased. It extends to lands in the city, and to those in the
country. On the border of the river no factories or mills could be erected,
or any other buildings. In the cities no wharves could be built, nor
could the lands ever be raised by filling in earth so that the same could be
useful for streets, stores and, dwellings. The inhabitants in the lower
part of a city could not be protected by levies from the inundations which
would destroy their dwellings. In the country not only could no embank-
ments or levees be raised, but the lowlands and marshes could not be filled
up and made valuable for cultivation.
The present defendant may only at this time of the year be able to
cultivate his property so as to make a living, and we believe it would be
a harsh and arbitrary rule not to allow him to protect his property as he
wishes. It may hurt the plaintiff, but public policy, and sound principles
of equity demand he should suffer in a case like this. To protect himself
the only remedy we can see is to construct a wall similar to that of the
defendant's. For these various reasons, and principles of law, we believe
the plaidtiff has no action. Plaintiff non-suited.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
A stream is accustomed to flow in a certain channel. But the channel
will have various widths, according to the amount of water flowing. In
the dry season, it may be but twenty yards wide. In the wet, its width
may be 100 yards. Not as many days of the year does the water cover
100 yards as over twenty, but the channel of the former width is never-
theless a customary channel.
A riparian owner has no right, it will be conceded, to narrow the 20
yards channel. Why then should he to narrow the 100 yards? It is as
natural for the stream to be broad in the spring, as to be narrow after
midsummer, and its waters in the former season should no less have free
progress, than in the latter.
Building a levee or dyke within the 20 yards of the midsummer chan-
nel would force the water further upon the opposite, shore, and the caus-
ation of this invasion of that shore, would be an actionable wrong to
its owner. How is building of a levee within 100 yards of the spring
channel, with a similar result, any the less a wrong?
No light is shed on the question by the conception of "surf ace-water".
The water of all rivers was once surface water. Water fell on wide
tracts. So much of it as did not evaporate, or was not absorbed into the
sail, poured over the inclined surfaces into the deeper depressions. These
reticulated; the waters in the smaller channels united in the larger,
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Hundreds of these larger channels conyerged-into a creek, or a river. So,
water, once in a stream, may overflow its banks, and inundate a tract of
land, may lose its connection with the river whence it escaped, so that as
its quantity'lessens it will not run back thereinto. It is now again sur-
face water; that is, water on the surface which does not form part of a.
stream; which will disappear if at all, only by evaporation or absorption
into the soil.
When a stream, which in midsummer is only 20 yards wide, becomes
in the spring 100 yards wide, it-is no less a stream at the latter than it
was at the former time. The large volume moves, .flows, as the smaller
did. Its channel is as unitary, Us customary, andlas.well defined.
There may be extraordinary occasions, when water in sufficient quan-
titles to fill a channel 150 -yards wide, flows; and- these may be so -rre
that it is wise not to require, the riparian owner to respect them in his
treatment of his banks. He may be allowed torefQrm.these banks so-as
to confine the waters in a narrower channel, say one of 120 yards. or 100
yards. But this policy would not extend to the toleration of a contraction
of. the width of the regular spring channel.
In the case before us, thaws had for some years back, regularly
flooded the riparian lands. They occurred every spring. They were not
so rare as to.escape remembrance, or as to make provision for them seem
fantastic and super-cautious. There is no sufficient reason for forbidding
any narrowing of the 20 yard channel, while allowing the narrowing of
the 100 yard channel.
Adamson's erection of the wall compelled the water to extend more
widely over Barton's land. unless he erected a similar wall. Why should
he be compelled to go to the expense of the construction, or to suffer this
increased inundation? If he built a wall the effect of the straightening
of the channel might be to cause expansions of the water over upper
lands of others heretofore free, or to unduly retard the advance of the
water over the riparian lands. Unforeseen difficulties are avoided by
adopting the principle that the channel regularly, even if not constantly,
occupied by a stream must not be narrowed by an owner of land, without
the consent of other owners whose land will be affected detrimentally in
consequence. Support of this principle may be found in 2 Farnham
Waters, 1723; 3 Farnham 2563. Hartshorne v. ChAddock, 135, N. Y. 116;
King v. Trafford, 1 Bar. & Ad. 874; R. R. Co. v. Brevoort, 25 L. R. A.
527; and others, cited by the learned counsel for the plaintiff.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
The Rationale of the Injunction, an article by Dr. Trickett,
appears in the October number of the American Law Review.
It criticizes certain extra-judicial dicta of Justice Brewer, of the
Supreme Court of the United States, and points out the analogy
between law making by the legislature and law making by
the judges, and suggests the propriety of applying the constitu-
tional safeguards thbught proper in reference to the former, 'also
to the latter.
Worthy of note is the fact that all the graduates of the
Dickinson School of Law who took the recent final examination
in July were successful.
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EDITOR'S NOTE.
The namd of the publication, which heretofore has been the
"Forum," of the Dickinson. School of Law, will be, with .No. 1,
of Volume XIII, the "Dickinson Law Review."
Articles of value to the practicing attorney, by members Qf
the Faculty, as well as reviews of the latest legal publications,
will appear in each of the several numbers.
A valuable feature of the 1Aeview will be the reports of de-
cisions by members of the Faculty, together with briefs sub-
mitted by counsel, of cases, founded on recent legislation and
involving'important legal propositions.
Among the articles that will appear in the 1-908-1909 series
of the " Dickinson Law Review," are, "Sales By Sample,"
"Declarations On Will Cases," "Address of Counsel to Jury, t'
"Liability of Railroad Companies for Negligently Caused
Fires," "Reputation. Evidence," "Improper Remarks by Coun-
sel in Jury Trials," and " Refreshing RecollectiQn."
